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ABSTRACT This paper investigates unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-aided jamming technique for enabling
physical layer keyless security in scenarios where the exact eavesdropper location is unknown. We assume
that the unknown eavesdropper location is within an ellipse characterizing the coverage region of the
transmitter. By sequentially optimizing the transmit power, the flight path of the UAV and its jamming
power, we aim at maximizing the average secrecy rate with arbitrary eavesdropper location. Simulation
results demonstrate that the optimal flight path obtains better secrecy rate performance compared to that
using direct UAV flight path encasing the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Most importantly, even
with the unknown eavesdropper location, we obtained a secrecy rate that is comparable to a scenario when
the eavesdropper’s location is known. However, the average secrecy rate with the unknown eavesdropper
location varies depending on the proximity of the eavesdropper to the known location of the transmitter.
We also observe that due to the UAV-aided jamming, the average secrecy rate stabilizes at some point even
though the average received envelope power of the eavesdropper increases. This essentially demonstrates
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Secure communication, jamming, UAV, trajectory optimization, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting sensitive or confidential information is of
paramount interest to most businesses/organizations – pri-
vate, public, government, military or intelligence. In the
event that such data/information is made public, these busi-
nesses/organizations may face legal or financial ramifica-
tions. At the very least, they will suffer loss of customer
trust (e.g. companies, etc.); but in the worst case, it could
lead to the complete annihilation of the organization (e.g.
Military, etc.). Thus, secure communications are obligatory to
most businesses/organizations and in this sense seen as a pri-
mordial requirement of technological and military exploits.
However, as technologies continue to explode, especially
with the development of modern computing technologies,
the internet of things (IoT), 5G and future generation net-
works, adverse robust ways of information theft continue
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Parul Garg.
to grow [1], [2]. In practice, a total secured communica-
tion is unattainable, nevertheless, theories seem to support
a measure that is acceptable [3], [4]. It is important that
communication be unique in all the layers of the communi-
cation model - open system interconnection (OSI) and/or the
internet model to guarantee its security. Different protocols
and techniques have been developed in the literature for
the security in the layers of these models [4]. Public and
private key-based cryptographic security measures are most
widely used in many communication systems. However,
cryptographic security is heavily computation demanding in
one hand, thus impractical in many IoT applications, and
subject to sophisticated external attacks with the advent of
modern computing facilities on the other hand. Developing
novel security measures to combat such attacks is there-
fore of prime interest for many researchers. In this context,
the notion of physical layer security has attracted significant
attention due to its ability to provide information-theoretic
security [4]–[7].
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The physical layer is similar in most communication mod-
els as it deals with processing the encapsulated message for
transmission via the channel [8]. In wireless communications,
it deals directly with the electromagnetic waves referred to
as signals. These signals can be compromised via eaves-
dropping and jamming of legitimate receivers. Focusing on
the eavesdropping, the security in the physical layer can be
subdivided into key-based and keyless security models. The
primary objective of both models is to reduce the ability of
an illegitimate user to gain access to the transmitted mes-
sage. While the key-based models use information obscu-
rity as its main tool, the keyless models detect the possible
information leak in the presence of eavesdropper(s)1 and
attempts to decrease its intercepted information. The degree
of information protection in a keyless physical layer security
model is measured as the secrecy capacity for delay tolerant
applications and the outage probability for delay intolerant
applications. To maximize the secrecy capacity, [3] proposed
an on/off algorithm that varies the power transmitted from the
source especially when the eavesdropper have better channel
quality. It relied on the principle that the source knows the
channel state of the eavesdropper based on inherent chan-
nel monitoring. While this scheme reduces the information
content received by the legitimate receiver, it also has lim-
ited practical applications as the channel information of the
eavesdropper is usually unknown. Instead of reducing the
transmit power, a more sophisticated approach could be to
deliberately jam the eavesdropper’s channel ensuring that it
receives little/no information. The major limitation of this
technique is that the eavesdropper will usually operate at the
same band as the legitimate receiver, hence the jamming will
also affect the legitimate receiver. A combination of jamming
and power variation, harnessing their gains is subsequently
the bedrock of modern signal jamming techniques.
Signal jamming as a physical layer protection strategy is
one of themost prominent brute-forcemethods of limiting the
information theft in keyless physical layer security exploiting
the fading characteristics of the channel [8]. It entails simul-
taneous transmission of a signal with similar characteristics
to the genuine signal but carrying no information content
to cause interference to the eavesdropper’s received signal.
Although this technique does not guarantee that there will be
no information leakage, similar to other security techniques,
it reduces the probability of successful interception thereby
increasing the secrecy capacity of the end-to-end communi-
cation. While jamming poses to be an effective technique for
improving secrecy, there are some critical issues that affect
the effectiveness of signal jamming:
(a) The degree of transmit power required to increase the
secrecy capacity without adversely degrading the infor-
mation content of the desired receiver,
1The kind of eavesdroppers referred to in this paper are considered as
passive Wyner wiretappers [9] which do not attempt to alter the transmitted
message but try to overhear only.
(b) The transmitter’s responses to the knowledge of the pos-
sible eavesdropper(s),
(c) The optimal location to deliver the jamming signals from.
Researchers have since investigated these requirements
independently as in [10], however, the investigation of the
collective effects of (a)-(c) is of practical interest due to
their inter-dependency in the context of secrecy performance.
While some recent studies affirm that this technique yields
improvement in the secrecy capacity, they are all based on
the impractical assumption that the eavesdropper(s’) location
is perfectly known at the transmitter [11].
With respect to the known remote eavesdropper location,
mobilemeans of delivering the jamming signals have recently
been investigated in the literature. One of the effective meth-
ods proposed is the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
in scenarios where the nodes under consideration (the source,
the main receiver and the eavesdropper) are all based on the
ground. This is primarily due to its aerial radio visibility of
the ground terminals, its cost efficiency and its availability
for low-range applications. The applications of UAVs in com-
munications range from their use as aerial base stations [12]–
[15], as relay nodes [16], as access/user nodes [11], [12] to
channel estimation [17], etc. Recently, with the advancement
of the internet of things (IoT), network of UAVs for UAV-to-
UAV communications as well as for general data transmission
has also been considered [18].
More recently, UAVs have been deployed for assisting in
secure communications between ground terminals [19], [20],
and to act as both relay nodes and security agents between
ground terminals [21]. In [22], the UAV is deployed with two
opposing roles namely, to establish favorable and degraded
channels for the legitimate and the eavesdropping links,
respectively. A separate jammer UAV has been considered in
[23] to degrade the eavesdropping channel in addition to the
cooperative UAV for the legitimate channel. Subsequently,
UAVs have also been used to deliver classified messages to
ground terminals amidst the constraints of eavesdroppers and
no-fly regions in [24]. Critical examination reveals that the
methods used in [19]–[24] are similar in principle since they
optimized the transmitted power, the UAV jamming power
and its trajectory for the corresponding scenarios. However,
a strong assumption made in [19]–[24] is that the location
of the eavesdropper(s) is known to the source and/or the
UAV(s). Although this assumption simplifies the respective
problem in each scenario, it is grossly impractical. In most
practical communication scenarios, even knowing the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper is often very difficult let alone
knowing their exact locations or channel state information
(CSI). This practical challenge motivates us to investigate
secret communication with unknown eavesdropper location
in this paper. We consider UAV-aided jamming technique for
proactively degrading the eavesdropping channel at unknown
ground point for improving the achievable secrecy rate.
An attempt to introduce eavesdropper obscurity has also
been made by Miao Cui, et al. in [25]. The authors in [25]
72882 VOLUME 8, 2020
C. O. Nnamani et al.: UAV-Aided Jamming for Secure Ground Communication With Unknown Eavesdropper Location
considered the UAV as the information source and optimized
its trajectory and transmitting power to a legitimate receiver
amidst a group of eavesdroppers located within an indepen-
dent small uncertainty region. The trajectory of the UAV has
been optimized to find the best points in the space to deliver
the maximum information to the legitimate receiver while
the eavesdroppers receive minimum information. In con-
trast, we consider the UAV with an opposing role in this
paper to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel via cooperative
jamming. Note that our work differs from [25] not just in
terms of the UAV’s role, but also in terms of guaranteed
secrecy performance. In fact, the achievable secrecy per-
formance in [25] cannot be guaranteed as the uncertainty
region expands and overlaps with the certainty region of
the legitimate receiver. Furthermore, a network of legitimate
and illegitimate UAVs has been considered in [26] in which
a UAV acts as the base station to transmit signal to other
legitimate UAVs in altitude and the eavesdropper UAVs from
unknown locations try to overhear the signal. The secrecy
outage probability and the average secrecy rate performance
have been analyzed. Since all the nodes are at the same
altitude, the gains of aerial visibility of UAV was subdued.
In this work, we intend to explore this opportunity for ground
nodes (source, legitimate receiver and eavesdropper) in order
to maximize the benefits of aerial visibility of the UAV while
constrained by the properties of ground propagation.
We formulate the problem of maximizing the aver-
age secrecy rate under the unknown eavesdropper location
assumption by jointly optimizing the source transmit power,
the UAV trajectory and its jamming power. The problem is
strictly non-convex due to the correlation of the optimization
variables in the problem. Therefore, in this work, we sequen-
tially optimize the flight path of a UAV, its jamming power
and the transmitted power by the source node to ensure
secure communication in the considered scenario. One set
of variables are optimized in each step while keeping the
others fixed. The main contributions in this paper can be
summarized as:
(a) Developing the mathematical analysis of UAV-aided
jamming applications to secure wireless communication
when the location of the eavesdropper is completely
unknown.
(b) Applying the block coordinate descent method and suc-
cessive convex approximation (SCA) technique with the
aid of the first-order Taylor series expansion.
(c) Unveiling the influence of the unknown eavesdropper’s
received power on the average secrecy rate between the
source and the legitimate receiver.
(d) Validating the formulations and the solutions by demon-
strating the performance of the proposed algorithm
against existing UAV-aided secure communication
schemes through extensive numerical simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the UAV-aided communication system model and
the problem formulation. The proposed solution is developed
FIGURE 1. UAV-aided jamming for secure communication.
in Section III. Simulation results are presented in Section IV
before making the concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secure wireless communication scenario
between a base station (BS) acting as a transmitting source
(Alice) located at an a-priori known ground point2 wa =
[xa, ya, 0]T and a receiver (Bob) at an a-priori known ground
point wb = [xb, yb, 0]T as shown in Fig. 1. However,
an eavesdropper (Eve) lurks around the area in an unknown
ground location, w̃e = [x̃e, ỹe, 0]T , but within the area where
the wireless signal can be received. We denote the complex
block-fading channels of Alice with Bob and Eve as gb and
ge, respectively. Since Eve’s location is unknown, Alice’s
transmission power Pa is a function of Bob’s channel power
gain hb = E[|gb|2] alone; hence Pa = P(hb), i.e. Alice varies
her transmission power depending on the channel state of
Bob. Averaging through all fading realizations of the channels
of Bob and Eve, the average secrecy rate and secrecy capacity
derived fromShannon’s information content are given respec-
tively as [3]
Rs =
∫ ∫
[ log2(1+ hbP(hb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Bob
− log2(1+ heP(hb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Eve
]+
× f (hb)f (he) dhe dhb, (1)
Cs = max
P(hb)
Rs (2)
whereRs, Cs, andP(hb) are the average secrecy rate,3 secrecy
capacity, and transmit power from Alice, respectively, hb, he
= E[|ge|2], and f (hb), f (he) are the channel power gain
and probability density functions (PDF) of Bob and Eve,
respectively. [a]+ indicates max(0, a). Note that [·]+ imposes
a constraint such that Eve cannot receive higher information
2z-coordinate represents the altitude and the ground point is located at z
= 0.
3Nota bene: All logarithms used in this work is of base 2 since we refer to
digital communications.
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than Bob at any time during the communication. Hence, in the
subsequent formulations, the [·]+ will be ignored since the
value of the integral function is always non-negative. Accord-
ingly, the limits of the integrals in (1) are defined such that
when he > hb, the mutual information betweenAlice and Eve
is upper-bounded by log2(1+hbP(hb)). This ensures that aver-
aging the secrecy rate over all possible channel realizations
of Eve is upper bounded by the channel of Bob following
the variable rate scheme described in [3]. Nevertheless, it is
desirable that the rate of Bob be as high as possible and only
limited by the power constraints of Alice (transmitter), hence,
(1) reduces to
Rs =
∫
∞
0
∫ hb
0
[log2(1+ hbP(hb)− log2(1+ heP(hb]
× f (hb)f (he) dhe dhb. (3)
The objective of keyless physical layer security is to ensure
that (2) is sustained at its optimal value over the duration of
the communication.
Note that the achievable secrecy rate in (1) describes the
secrecy rate as the difference of the average information
rates of Bob and Eve over all fading realizations of Bob
and Eve. The non-negativity assumption on the secrecy rate
[·]+ requires that the location of Eve revolves around that of
Bob and not beyond the coverage region of Alice. However,
in practice, Eve may even be located at positions closer to
Alice than Bob and thereby receive stronger signals than
Bob assuming they both share the same channel model based
on the proximity to the transmitter alone. In such scenarios,
the achievable secrecy rate would be zero as defined in (3).
To ameliorate the aforementioned challenge, we deploy a
UAV that will deliver jamming signals to reduce the informa-
tion acquired by Eve while attempting to sustain that obtained
by Bob. However, in UAV-aided communications, a common
challenge is to optimize the UAV trajectory [12]. In secure
communications, the challenge is further proliferated by the
unknown eavesdropper location. We aim at addressing this
challenge in the following sections. The UAV flight path will
be optimized to ensure that for any location of Eve within
the coverage region of Alice, its information rate will be
continually below that of Bob, thereby, achieving positive
secrecy rates.
We assume that the UAV is not equipped with any tracking
devices. Therefore, the UAVwill not be able to locate or track
Eve despite having a clear line-of-sight (LoS) to all points
within the coverage region of Alice due to aerial visibility.
Furthermore, if the UAVflies horizontally at constant altitude
from an initial point q0 to a final point qf , its ascent and
descent flight path to the initial and final ground points can
be neglected. The UAV flight duration, T , is sampled at
discrete time-stamps of N equal time slots with duration of
δ = T/N [16], [19]. The UAV maintains constant speed V
m/s and transmits a pulse of the jamming signal within a slot
δ. The channel within the slot is also assumed to vary slowly
allowing for block fading within the slot. Hence, increasing
the number of time slots, N , the UAV may be assumed to
transmit almost continuously. For simplicity, we assume that
V is constant over the entire flight duration as also assumed in
[19]. If the distance covered in each sample is small enough,
we can assume that the UAV is stationary at each sample
point. Considering a large number of sample points, the UAV
is assumed to send jamming signals continuously. These
sampled points can be denoted as q[n] =
[
x[n], y[n], z[n]
]T ,
n ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, which satisfies the following constraints:
‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖2 ≤ (V δ)2 (4a)
‖q[1]− q0‖
2
≤ (V δ)2 (4b)
q[N ] = qf (4c)
‖q[n]− wa‖ + ‖q[n]− wb‖ ≤ 2a (4d)
q(xn, yn, zn) = q(xn, yn,H ). (4e)
Inequalities (4a) and (4b) ensure that the distance covered by
the UAV within the flight samples does not exceed the para-
metric distance. The velocity V m/s is chosen such that the
total distance covered by the UAV through the samples will
be greater than or equal to the Euclidean distance between
q0 and qf , i.e., (V δ) ≥ ‖qf − qo‖, otherwise the system will
be intractable. This ensures that the UAV travels at least in
a straight path from its initial to its final points for a given
total flight duration. The equality in (4c) ensures that the final
flight point of the UAV is at the a-priori final destination,
while (4d) allows the UAV to remain within the uncertainty
region where the eavesdropper can be found. This region is
postulated as an ellipse and physically represents a cellular
coverage region of Alice. a determines the size of the ellipse
and satisfies {for a > ‖wb − wa‖}, wa and wb are the two
foci of the ellipse, ensuring that Bob is not a cell-edge user.
Finally, (4e) places the UAV to fly at constant altitude denoted
by H meters.
Assuming that the ground fading channel between Alice
and Bob is Rayleigh distributed, the lower bound of the
channel power gain (corresponding to the worst channel con-
dition) with the jamming signal delivered by the UAV is given
by [20], [22], [23]
hb[n] =
ground channel gain︷ ︸︸ ︷
βod
−ψ
ab E[ζ ]
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LoS jamming signal attenuation
, (5)
where ψ is the ground path loss component between Alice
and Bob, β0 represents the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at a
reference distance (d0 = 1m) of the ground channels, ζ is
an exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean
(E[ζ ] = 1), dab and dqb are the Euclidean distance between
Alice, UAV and Bob respectively and Pu is the UAV jamming
signal power.
We note that (5) is the upper bound of the random complex
channel gb as expressed in [22, eq. (12)]. Thus the channel
power gain of Bob (hb) has been discretized to reflect the
discrete interference caused by the UAV jamming signal as
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represented by the N samples. We also note that the choice of
integrals in (3) depicts averaging over all channel realizations
of Bob and Eve. Clearly,
∫
∞
0 g(hb)f (hb)dhb shows that the
channel realization of Bob, hb, is continuous over an infinite
space. However, based on the discrete-time samples of the
UAV trajectory, hb is discretized as shown in (5) to represent
the channel of Bob under the jamming signal delivered by the
UAV at each sampled slot. Hence, assuming slow fading in
between slots of the UAVflight time, it is sufficient to find the
average in (3) under the discrete-time block fading samples
as in [14], [19]:
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫ hb[n]
0
[log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n]
− log(1+ he[n]Pa[n]]f (he)dhe. (6)
To ensure that the power levels of the communica-
tion is within acceptable range, Pu and Pa are sub-
jected to average and peak power constraints described as:
0 ≤ Pu[n] ≤ Pumax (7a)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pu[n] ≤ P̄ub (7b)
0 ≤ Pa[n] ≤ Pamax (7c)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pa[n] ≤ P̄ab. (7d)
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let Q = {q[n], n ∈ N }, pa = {Pa[n], n ∈ N }, and pu =
{Pu[n], n ∈ N } be the set of UAV sample points (representing
its trajectory when connected by a straight line), the set of
power transmitted by Alice as well as the UAV, respectively.
We aim at solving (2) by alternating the optimization of Q,
pa and pu.
In order to solve (6), we need to know the possible distri-
bution of the fading channel of Eve which can be obtained via
historical measurements collected over the region covered by
Alice (represented in thismodel as an ellipse, as in (4d)). If we
consider that the time-varying complex channel ge(t) of Eve
is normally distributed with mean zero and known variance
such that ge(t) = ge,I (t)+ige,Q(t), where ge,I , ge,Q∼ C(0, b0)
are the in-phase and quadrature components of ge(t), then its
magnitude, α(t) = |ge(t)|, will be Rayleigh distributed with
average envelop powerE[α2] = 2b0 , ye. The instantaneous
envelop power is the squared envelop α2(t) = |g(t)|2 , he
and is exponentially distributed as
f (he) =
1
ye
e−
he[n]
ye , ∀he ≥ 0. (8)
Considering block fading within a slot, the channel variations
are negligible for the time in between slots, as N becomes
very large. Substituting (8) in (6), we obtain
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])(1− e
−
hm
ye )
+
∫ hb[n]
0
log(1+ he[n]Pa[n])(
1
ye
e−
he
ye )dhe. (9)
By applying integration by parts, (9) reduces to
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Bob
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1+ he[n]Pa[n]
dhe︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Eve
. (10)
The secrecy rate in (10) can be further simplified as [27,
eq. 3.352.1]
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])
− e
1
yePa[n]
[
Ei
(
−
hb[n]
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)
−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
, (11)
where Ei(x) =
∫
∞
x
e−t
t dt is the exponential integral. We
note that (10) is equivalent to (11) and they can be used
interchangeably depending on the parameter been inferred.
Thus we substitute the objective function in (2) with the
elaborated form in (11) to obtain the following optimization
problem4:
(P1) : max
pa,pu,Q
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])
−e
1
yePa[n]
[
Ei
(
−
hb[n]
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)
−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(12a)
s.t. ‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖2 ≤ (V δ)2 (12b)
‖q[1]− q0‖
2
≤ (V δ)2 (12c)
q[N ] = qf (12d)
‖q[n]− wa‖ + ‖q[n]− wb‖ ≤ 2a (12e)
q(xn, yn, zn) = q(xn, yn,H ), (12f)
0 ≤ Pu[n] ≤ Pumax (12g)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pu[n] ≤ P̄ub (12h)
0 ≤ Pa[n] ≤ Pamax (12i)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pa[n] ≤ P̄ab. (12j)
4We neglected the constant scaling factor 1N in the objective function as
this does not affect the optimal solution.
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Problem (P1) entails that the secrecy capacity of the proposed
system depends on the optimal transmission power of Alice,
the jamming power delivered by the UAV and the UAV loca-
tion. Unfortunately, (P1) is a non-convex optimization prob-
lem with respect to the optimization variables (pa,pu,Q) and
cannot be easily solved directly. However, using a sequential
and iterative technique under a block coordinate approach,
we can obtain suboptimal solutions that satisfy the constraints
in (4) and (7).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
We propose solving the non-convex problem (P1) in an alter-
nating fashion. The proposed solution involves decompos-
ing the original problem (P1) into three sub-problems each
characterizing a set of optimization variables. In each sub-
problem, we optimize one set of variables while fixing the
other variables in each iteration. The results obtained from
each iteration step are analyzed with the objective value of
(P1) and the iteration stops at the point when the objective
value (P1) converges.
A. OPTIMIZING THE SOURCE POWER (Pa)
We first optimize Alice’s transmit power for arbitrary initial
trajectory and jamming power. Replacing the objective in
problem (P1) with (10), problem (P1) can be reformulated
for any given Q and pu as problem (P2):
(P2) : max
pa
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1+ he[n]Pa[n]
dhe (13a)
s.t. (7c) and (7d). (13b)
Note that problem (P2) is still non-convex over the entire
domain of pa. However, for the region under peak and average
power constraints, the objective can be shown to be the sum
of a concave and a convex functions. The proof is relegated
to Appendix.
Since the objective function of problem (P2) is differen-
tiable (as demonstrated in Appendix), it can be solved using
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for non-convex
problems [28, section 3.2.1].We note that the KKT solution is
the optimal solution for the non-convex problem only for very
large value of N. This is because the time-sharing conditions
for non-convex problems lead to negligible duality gap only
when N is very large [29]. The KKT conditions relevant to
the solution are defined as
∇f0(x∗)+ λ∗∇fn(x∗) = 0, (14a)
λ∗fn(x∗) = 0, (14b)
where f0 is the objective in problem (P2), fn are the constraints
in (7c) and (7d) and x∗ is the optimal value of Pa. Simul-
taneously solving (14) using [27, eq. 0.410 and 3.462.17]
respectively, we obtain
−
[
hb[n]
1+ hb[n]Pa[n]
−
1
ye(Pa[n])2
e
1
yePa[n][
0
(
−1,
1
yePa[n]
)
− 0
(
−1,
hb[n]
ye
+
1
yePa[n]
)]]
×
N∑
n=1
Pa[n]−
1
N
P̄ab = 0, (15)
where 0(−i, z) = (−1)
i
i! (E1(z) − e
−z∑i−1
k=0
(−1)kk!
zk+1
) [30,
eq. 8.4.15]). Solving (15) with a non-linear solver produces
the suboptimal values of Pa.
B. OPTIMIZING THE UAV JAMMING POWER (Pu)
To optimize the jamming power pu delivered by the UAV,
we consider pu as the optimization variable while fixing the
values of pa and Q. Problem (P1) is then reformulated
while substituting for hb[n] as
(P3) : max
pu
N∑
n=1
log
(
1+
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+ 1
)
− e
1
yePa[n] ×
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]

−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(16a)
s.t. (7a) and (7b). (16b)
Under the constraints, the objective of Problem (P3) is a non-
convex functionwith respect to pu due to the non-convexity of
the information rate of the Eve. However, the information rate
of Bob is concave with respect to pu. Hence, problem (P3)
can be solved using successive convex approximation (SCA)
approach [31], [32]. Note that SCA (also known as majoriza-
tion minimization) is a popular optimization approach for
solving this type of problems by iteratively solving a locally
tight approximation of the original optimization problem,
subject to a tight convex restriction of the constraint sets [32].
Given an initial UAV jamming power in the k-th iteration
as pku = {P
k
u[n], n ∈ N }; we have using first order Taylor
expansion that
e
1
yePa[n]
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]

−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
≤ Gk [n]+ Tk [n](Pu[n]− Pku[n]),
(17)
where
Gk [n] = e
1
yePa[n]
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pku[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]

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−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
and Tk [n] =
Pa[n]β2od
−ψ
ab d
−2
qb [n]e
−(
βod
−ψ
ab
yeβod
−2
qb [n]P
k
u [n]+ye
)
(βod
−2
qb [n]P
k
u[n]+1)(Pa[n]βod
−ψ
ab +βod
−2
qb [n]P
k
u[n]+1)
.
Taking only the non-constant terms in (17), problem (P3) can
be reformulated as
(P3b) : max
pu
N∑
n=1
[
log
(
1+
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n]+ 1
)
−Tk [n]Pu[n]] (18a)
s.t. (7a) and (7b). (18b)
Note that (P3b) maximizes the lower bound of the original
objective problem, (P3a). Hence, it suffices that the objective
value obtained by solving (P3b) is at least equal to the solution
obtained by solving (P3a) using the updated Pku. As we iterate
over k iterations, the Taylor expansion of (P3b) ensures that
its objective value is the same as that of (P3a). Problem (P3b)
is a convex problem within the constrained region and can
be efficiently solved using interior-point method or a convex
solver such as CVX [33], [34].
C. OPTIMIZING THE UAV TRAJECTORY (Q)
In this sub-problem, the problem (P1) is recast to ensure
that only the UAV trajectory, Q is the optimization param-
eter. However, the reformulated problem is non-convex in Q.
Hence, to reduce computational complexity, we introduce a
slack variableM = {m[n] = ‖q[n]− wb‖2, n ∈ N } such that
d−2qb [n] =
1
m[n] . Thus we obtain the following optimization
problem:
(P4) : max
Q,M
m
N∑
n=1
log
(
1+
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βo
m[n] + 1
)
− e
1
yePa[n]
×
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
m[n] +1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]

−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(19a)
s.t. m[n]− ‖q[n]− wb‖2 ≤ 0, (19b)
and (4). (19c)
Due to the non-convexity of problem (P4) with respect to the
trajectory, q[n], we reformulate the problem using successive
approximation with the first order Taylor expansion. Let
Qk [n] = {qk [n], n ∈ N } denote the initial UAV trajectory
for the kth iteration. Then the objective function of problem
(P4) can be rewritten as
e
1
yePa[n]
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
m[n] +1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)− Ei(−
1
yePa[n]


≤ Ok [n]+Wk [n](q[n]− qk [n]) (20)
−‖q[n]− wb‖2 ≤ Sk [n], (21)
where
Ok [n] = e
1
yePa[n]
Ei
−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
mk [n]
+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]

−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
Wk [n] =
β2od
−ψ
ab Pu[n]e
− βod
−ψ
ab
ye
(
1+ βoPu[n]mk [n]
)
ye
(
−
1
yePa[n]
−
βod
−ψ
ab
ye
(
1+ βoPu[n]mk [n]
)
)(
1+ βoPu[n]mk [n]
)
m2k [n]
,
and Sk [n] = ‖qk [n]‖2 − 2[qk [n] − wb]T q[n] − ‖wb‖2.
Under similar conditions as of problem (P3), (P4) can be
reformulated as
(P4b) : max
Q,M
N∑
n=1
log
(
1+
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βo
m[n] + 1
)
−Wk [n]m[n]
s.t. m[n]+ Sk [n] ≤ 0, (22a)
and (4). (22b)
Problem (P4b) is a convex problem in Q under the speci-
fied constraints and can be solved using interior-point meth-
ods or with a convex solver. The overall procedure has been
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for Solving pa, pu, and Q
1: Initialize pu and Q such that the constraints in (7a), (7b)
and (4) are satisfied.
2: m← 1.
3: repeat
4: Compute and update pa in (15) with given pu and Q.
5: Using updated pa and current Q, solve (18) for pu.
6: With given pa and pu, find Q by solving problem (22).
7: Compute Rs as defined in (11).
8: e = R
new
s −R
old
s
Rnews
.
9: m← m+ 1.
10: until e < θ OR m ≥ mmax .
11: Output: pa, pu, and Q.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
solution approach through numerical simulations. We imple-
ment the solution discussed in Section III following the proce-
dure described in Algorithm 1. The optimization parameters
are initialized by solving the feasibility problem such that the
the initial values just satisfy their respective constraints. The
feasibility problem can be formulated by setting the objective
of problem (12) to zero, with all the primary constraints
unchanged. Then, by iteratively optimizing each parameter
with the knowledge of the others, we obtain the suboptimal
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TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
solution to problem (P1) when the error (e) between steps is
less than θ (where θ = 10−5) or the maximum number of
iterations is reached (where mmax = 200).
Similar to the convergence analysis in [20], Algorithm 1 is
guaranteed to converge for all feasible initial points. This is
shown in Fig. 2 where a fast convergence is observed for
different scenarios of the UAVflight time. In Fig. 2, the ProW
algorithm represents the proposed solution to the unknown
Eve problemwhile the associated numbers represent the UAV
flight time. In all the simulations, we used the parameters as
described in Table 1 unless otherwise specified.
We then analyze the secrecy rate performance of the
proposed scheme as compared with the existing schemes.
In Fig. 3, the performance of the unknown Eve location
scenario using the proposed joint trajectory and power opti-
mization algorithm (referred to as ProW) is compared the
known Eve location scenario considered in [19] (referred to
as JT&P).We also compare the performancewith the baseline
scheme without optimizing the UAV trajectory referred to as
Straight), in which theUAVflies straight to the location above
the eavesdropper. The associated numbers in the legends rep-
resent the respective Euclidean distances from Alice (source)
to Bob for the ProW algorithm (recall unknown Eve location)
and from Alice to Eve for the JT&P algorithm based on
the locations specified in Table 1. Nevertheless, from Fig. 4
to Fig. 8, the numbers attached to the acronyms depict the
UAV flight time in seconds. Results in Fig. 3 illustrate that
the direct flight path with constant power (Straight) scheme
performs the worst in terms of the average secrecy rate. Due
to the jamming signals delivered by the UAV, the average
secrecy rate of the JT&P scheme is zero when the Eve is at
the same location as Bob. As Eve moves away from Bob,
FIGURE 2. Convergence performance of Algorithm 1.
FIGURE 3. Average secrecy rate with ‘unknown’ as well as ‘known’
eavesdropper locations, and direct UAV flight path.
the average secrecy rate increases since the UAV locates
Eve and stays at an optimum location to jam her signal.
Nevertheless, since the location of Eve is unknown (as in
ProW 300), the average secrecy rate is shown to be close to
the JT&P scheme when Eve is closer to Alice and is sup-
posed to receive more information content without the UAV
jamming. However, considering that ProW 300 is near to a
practical scenario, this marginal decrease in performancemay
be considered as the near practical trade-off to the scheme.
Also, it is important to note that the information rate of
both Bob and Eve is affected by the jamming signal of the
UAV. However, Eve is affected more, even when it has better
channel condition (measured in terms of its average received
envelope power), as the UAV regularly finds paths such that
it stays further from Bob and estimates as close to Eve as
possible until it flies to its final point. This allows for positive
average secrecy rates shown in Fig. 3.
The flight trajectory of the UAV with respect to Alice and
Bob is shown in Fig. 4. The 2D plot shows that from an aerial
view, the trajectory of the UAV follows a given pattern bound
by the uncertainty region of Eve (ellipse) provided it flies at a
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FIGURE 4. UAV flight trajectory in 2D and 3D view while Eve location is
unknown (For clarity, we use δ = 10).
FIGURE 5. Effect of average received envelop power of Eve on average
secrecy rate.
constant altitude. However, to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach in practice, we also plot a 3D view
of the trajectory in Fig. 4. The 3D plot shows that the UAV
trajectory moves towards the opposite of Bob while ensuring
that the jamming signal is still delivered to all points within
the constrained region of Eve.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 examines the constraints posed by
the assumptions on the property of Eve’s channel. We recall
that the only known property of Eve is its average received
envelop power, ye. Hence Fig. 5 presents the effect of vary-
ing ye on the average secrecy rate. It can be observed that
increase in ye decreases the average secrecy rate via a positive
exponential path. Hence, for large values of ye characterizing
Eve having better reception equipment and channel state as
compared to Bob, the decrement in average secrecy rate with
respect to increasing ye becomes negligible. The optimized
UAV path ensures that even when the location of Eve is
unknown, the average secrecy rate of the communication
between Alice and Bob can be guaranteed despite Eve sup-
posedly receiving signals with high envelope power. While
FIGURE 6. Influence of UAV altitude (height) on average secrecy rate
under the proposed scheme.
FIGURE 7. Influence of UAV flying speed on average secrecy rate with
obscure Eve.
FIGURE 8. Average secrecy rate versus signal-noise-ratio (SNR) with
obscure Eve.
this average secrecy rate is low, it can be improved by increas-
ing the time of flight of the UAV or allowing the UAV to fly
throughout the communication duration as shown in Figs. 3
and 5.
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FIGURE 9. Comparing transmitted power between Alice and UAV.
Other factors that affect the average secrecy rate in the con-
sidered scenario of unknown eavesdropper location include
the UAV height and speed, and the SNR of the environ-
ment. Figs. 6, 7 and 8 show the average secrecy rate of
the proposed system compared to the UAV altitude, speed
and ground node SNR, respectively. It can be observed that
the impact of flying the UAV at higher altitude is minimal
in terms of average secrecy rate, compared to allowing it
to fly at longer duration. The trend in Fig. 6 suggests that
the average secrecy rate increases with increase in the UAV
altitude/height. However, we observed from our simulations
that for large values of UAV flight altitude, the trajectory
optimization problem (P4) becomes infeasible. Increasing
the UAV speed and ground nodes SNR tend to increase the
average secrecy rate with a logarithmic path. Nevertheless,
the rate of increase is higher with the UAV speed than the
SNR. As the UAV speed increases, its sample points increase
allowing it to deliver more jamming signal to Eve within its
flight time. Similar to results observed in [26], increasing the
ground SNR improves the secrecy, however, this parameter is
subject to characteristics of the outdoor environment which
cannot be easily controlled.
The optimized transmitting power of Alice (Pa) and the
optimized UAV jamming power (Pu) are plotted in Fig. 9.
While Alice transmits at its maximum power when the UAV
is close to Bob, the UAV transmits minimum jamming signal.
This ensures that the UAV interference to Bob is minimal and
Bob continues to receive the information sent by Alice.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have exploited UAV-aided jamming tech-
nique in reducing the information rate received by an eaves-
dropper in an unknown location. We solved the achiev-
able secrecy rate maximization problem using sequential
block coordinate optimization method. While we were con-
strained by the elusive nature of the eavesdropper location,
we obtained a secrecy rate that is comparable to a scenario
when the eavesdropper’s location is known. We also showed
that the UAV speed and flight duration are amongst the main
parameters to consider while using UAV to increase physical
layer security. Most importantly, we have demonstrated that
the average received envelope power of the eavesdropper can-
not guarantee better information content as the secrecy rate
tends to stabilize with large envelope power. We propose that
future works investigate predicting the eavesdropper location
with the aid of deep learning techniques in order to update the
UAV flight path in real-time. This could reduce the latency
in continuously solving the optimization problem for each
communication block.
APPENDIX
In this section, we show that the non-convexity of (10) is the
sum of a concave and a convex functions in terms of Pa. From
(10), we obtain
Rs =
N∑
n=1
log(1+ hb[n]Pa[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1(Pa)
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1+ he[n]Pa[n]
dhe︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2(Pa)
. (23)
We consider (23) in two parts, showing their convexity with
the second derivative method. In general, the convexity of a
function is defined as [28]
f ′′(x) =

Convex :> 0
Concave :< 0
Affine := 0.
Thus we have from (23) that
f ′′1 (Pa) = −
(
hb
1+ hbPa
)2
.
We then show the convexity of the f2(Pa) using the princi-
ple that the nonnegative weighted-sum of a convex (concave)
function is a convex (concave) [28, Section 3.2.1]. The second
part can be rewritten as∫ hb[n]
0
e−
he[n]
ye
Pa[n]
1+ he[n]Pa[n]
dhe
≡
∫ hb[n]
0
w(he)f (Pa, he)dhe.
It has been shown in [28] that if f (Pa, he) is convex (concave),
then f2(Pa) is convex (concave). Thus, we have that the sec-
ond derivative of f2(Pa) as
f ′′2 (Pa) = −
2he
(1+ hePa)
.
Thus both parts of (23) are concave functions independently
under the constraint of hb ≥ 0 and Pa ≥ 0. These are the
positive semi-definite constraints that guarantees communi-
cation between the source and the destination. If hb < 0
and/or Pa < 0 then no information could be transmitted
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successfully. Therefore, we have that (23) is the sum of a
concave and a convex function (−f (x) = convex if f (x) =
concave) in terms of Pa.
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